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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-2074 
_____________ 
 
NICOLE HABERLE, In her own right, on behalf of her two 
minor children, and as administrator of the  
Estate of Timothy Nixon, deceased 
 
     Nicole Haberle, 
                           Appellant  
 
v. 
 
OFFICER DANIEL TROXELL, Individually, and in his 
official capacity as Nazareth Borough Police Officer;  
THOMAS TRACHTA, Individually, and in his official 
capacity as Nazareth Borough Police Chief;  
MAYOR CARL STYRE, Individually, and in his official 
capacity as Mayor of Nazareth Borough;  
PRESIDENT DAN CHIAVAROLI, Individually, and in his 
official capacity as President of Nazareth Borough Council;  
VICE PRESIDENT LARRY STOUDT, Individually, and in 
his official capacity as Vice President of Nazareth Borough 
Council; JOHN SAMUS, Individually, and in his official 
capacity as a member of Nazareth Borough Council;  
COUNCIL MEMBER MICHAEL KOPACH, Individually, 
and in his offical capacity as a member of Nazareth Borough 
Council; COUNCIL MEMBER FRANK MAUREK, 
Individually, and in his official capacity as a member of 
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Nazareth Borough Council; COUNCIL MEMBER 
CHARLES DONELLO, Individually, and in his official 
capacity as a  Member of Nazareth Borough Council; 
COUNCIL MEMBER CARL FISCHL, Individually, and in 
his official capacity as a member of Nazareth Borough 
Council; JOHN/JANE DOE POLICE STAFF #1-X, 
Individually, and in their official capacities as staff of the 
Nazareth Police Department; BOROUGH OF NAZARETH 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (E.D. Pa. No. 5-15-cv-02804) 
District Judge:  Hon. Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
_______________ 
 
 
Argued: November 4, 2016 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 20, 2018) 
 
_______________ 
 
 
Joseph E. Welsh   [ARGUED] 
Lauer & Fulmer 
701 Washington St. 
Easton, PA   18042 
          Counsel for Appellant 
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Rufus A. Jennings 
John P. Morgenstern   [ARGUED] 
Deasey Mahoney & Valentini 
1601 Market Street 
Suite 3400 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
          Counsel for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 
Timothy Nixon was a troubled man.  After stealing a 
firearm, he told his partner, Nicole Haberle, that he was going 
to commit suicide.  When a police officer employed by the 
Borough of Nazareth learned of that threat, he did not wait for 
trained crisis support professionals but instead knocked on the 
door of the apartment where Nixon was located and 
announced his presence.  Nixon immediately shot himself. 
 
Ms. Haberle has sued, on her own behalf and also as 
the administrator of Nixon’s  estate, claiming that that police 
officer – Daniel Troxell – and other law enforcement officers, 
and the Borough, violated the Constitution as well as a variety 
of federal and state statutes.  All of her claims were dismissed 
by the District Court, and she now appeals.  Her primary 
argument is that Troxell unconstitutionally seized Nixon and 
that Nixon’s suicide was the foreseeable result of a danger 
that Troxell created.  She also argues that the Borough 
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101-213 (the “ADA”), by, among other things, failing to 
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modify Borough policies, practices, and procedures to ensure 
that disabled individuals would have their needs met during 
interactions with the police.  Although we recognize the grief 
borne by those who cared deeply for Mr. Nixon, we are 
nonetheless persuaded that the District Court was largely 
correct in its disposition of this case.  But, because we 
conclude that Ms. Haberle should be given an opportunity to 
amend her complaint with respect to her ADA claim, we will 
affirm in part and vacate in part the District Court’s rulings, 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND1 
 
 Timothy Nixon suffered from a variety of mental 
health problems, including depression.  For years, he had 
lived off and on with his long-time partner, Ms. Haberle, and 
their two children.  On May 20, 2013, he had “a serious 
mental health episode involving severe depression.”  
(Opening Br. at 6.)  He called Haberle and told her that he 
was suicidal, and then broke into a friend’s home and took a 
handgun.  He next went to his cousin’s apartment. 
 
 Fearing for Nixon’s life, Haberle contacted the 
Borough of Nazareth Police Department.  Officer Daniel 
Troxell obtained a warrant for Nixon’s arrest, and, having 
learned that Nixon was still at his cousin’s apartment, Troxell 
                                              
1 When reviewing a decision to grant a motion to 
dismiss, we “accept as true all well-pleaded facts and 
allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences 
therefrom in favor of the plaintiff.”  Bell v. Cheswick 
Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 193 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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went there, accompanied by other officers from the Borough 
and surrounding municipalities.2   Upon arriving at the 
apartment, some of the officers suggested setting up a 
perimeter and asking the Pennsylvania State Police to send 
crisis negotiators.  Others suggested asking Haberle to help 
communicate with Nixon.  Troxell rebuffed those 
suggestions, calling the other officers “a bunch of f[---]ing 
pussies.”  (App. at 7.)  He declared his intention to 
immediately go to the apartment, because “[t]his is how we 
do things in Nazareth.”  (App. at 7.)  He did as he said, 
knocked on the door of the apartment, and identified himself 
as a police officer.  Nixon then promptly went into one of the 
bedrooms of the apartment and turned the stolen gun on 
himself.     
 
Following the suicide, Haberle sued Troxell, the other 
officers who were at the scene, the chief of police of 
Nazareth, the Mayor of Nazareth, and various members of the 
Borough Council, including the President and Vice-President, 
and the Borough of Nazareth itself.  Her complaint, as 
amended, included eleven counts.3  The Defendants moved 
                                              
2 According to Haberle, Nixon was not a danger to 
anyone and was peacefully drinking beer with his cousin.  
She does not, however, allege that Troxell knew what was 
happening inside the apartment. 
 
3 Haberle had been allowed to amend her complaint 
under the safe harbor provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11(c)(2) to remove some inflammatory rhetoric in 
the initial pleading.  The amended complaint includes claims 
listed as “[c]ounts.”  (See App. at 81-89.)  The first six claims 
were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Count one claimed 
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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to 
dismiss the amended complaint, and that motion was granted.  
The District Court did not grant Haberle an opportunity to 
further amend her complaint, concluding that any additional 
amendment would be futile.  This timely appeal followed.  
 
II. DISCUSSION4 
                                                                                                     
that Troxell had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments in a variety of ways, including depriving Nixon 
of his right to bodily integrity, freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, freedom from state-created dangers, 
and freedom from arbitrary conduct that shocks the 
conscience.  Count two claimed that all of the officers denied 
Nixon needed medical care.  Count three was against the 
officers other than Troxell and alleged a failure to intervene 
to prevent unconstitutional conduct.  Count four attempted to 
hold Troxell’s superiors responsible for Troxell’s conduct.  
Count five alleged municipal liability for a failure to train.  
Count six involved an allegation of civil conspiracy.  The 
seventh count alleged violations of the ADA by the Borough.  
The remaining counts claimed violations of state law, 
including intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death, and 
a survivorship action for lost revenue and pain and suffering.   
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction over Haberle’s 
federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  It had 
supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s dismissal 
order is de novo.  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 
230 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Haberle focuses on three arguments – two under 
provisions of the Constitution and one under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.  Specifically, she alleges that dismissal 
of her claims against Troxell was improper because Troxell’s 
actions amounted to an unconstitutional seizure in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.  She also claims that Troxell’s 
actions constituted a “state-created danger” in violation of the 
                                                                                                     
Haberle has standing to bring her § 1983 claims on 
behalf of Nixon as the administrator of his estate.  Giles v. 
Campbell, 698 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that 
the survival of claims is determined by reference to “the 
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution 
and statutes of the [forum] State,” unless inconsistent with 
federal law, and that “‘the survival of civil rights of actions 
under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or 
defendant’ was an area not covered by federal law” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 
588 (1978))); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8302 (“All 
causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, shall survive 
the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of 
one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants.”).  Haberle 
likewise has standing to bring the ADA claim even after 
Nixon’s death – either under federal common law or based on 
Pennsylvania law.  Compare Guenther v. Griffin Constr. Co., 
Inc., 846 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that an 
ADA claim survives the death of an injured party under 
federal common law), with Slade for Estate of Slade v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 952 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying 
state law to determine that a survivorship claim was 
permissible under the ADA). 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5  Finally, 
she argues that the Borough violated the ADA.  None of those 
arguments is persuasive. 
 
A. Troxell’s Actions Did Not Constitute an  
  Improper Seizure 
 
Police are entitled to “knock and talk” with people in a 
residence, and doing so is not a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 519 
(3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 
289-90 (4th Cir. 2001)).  In order to effectuate a seizure, there 
must be something more than “inoffensive contact between a 
member of the public and the police … .”  United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).  There must be, for 
instance, “the threatening presence of several officers, the 
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of 
the person of the citizen, … the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request 
might be compelled,” or some other communication that 
would convey to a reasonable person that compliance was not 
optional.  Id. at 554.  “[T]he subjective intention of the 
[officers] … is irrelevant except insofar as that may have 
been conveyed to the respondent.”  Id. at 554 n.6. 
 
In this case, the District Court correctly concluded that 
there was no seizure.  Whether or not well-advised, and 
                                              
5 A “state-created danger” may exist where a state 
actor either creates a harmful situation or increases a citizen’s 
exposure or vulnerability to an already-present danger.  See 
Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 281-82 (3d Cir. 
2006) (discussing the state-created danger doctrine). 
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despite his crudely expressed intentions, Troxell merely 
knocked on the door and announced his presence.  That alone 
is not enough to violate the Fourth Amendment.  There is no 
allegation that Troxell made intimidating remarks to Nixon or 
announced his presence in a threatening fashion.  Nor is there 
any allegation that Nixon was aware of the warrant or of the 
other officers that were outside of the apartment complex.  
The complaint gives no reason to believe that Nixon felt he 
was “not free to leave,” id. at 554, or that he was unable to 
“decline the [officer’s] requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter.”  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).  
Because Nixon’s liberty was not restricted, there was no 
seizure.  See Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 
171 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Given the Estate’s failure to establish 
[the decedent’s] knowledge of the [police] perimeter, no 
reasonable factfinder could find that a person in [the 
decedent’s] circumstances would have thought that the 
perimeter restricted his liberty to leave the ... residence.”). 
 
In any event, Troxell acted under color of a warrant, 
and Haberle does not argue that the warrant was invalid or 
was obtained under false pretenses or would have resulted in 
a false arrest.  Even if a seizure had occurred, then, it would 
not have been unlawful.  See Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 
F.3d 261, 273 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that an officer is 
immune from suit after an arrest based on a warrant, if there 
is a reasonable belief that the warrant is valid). 
 
B. Troxell’s Actions Did Not Cause a State- 
  Created Danger 
 
As a general principle, the government has no 
obligation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment to protect citizens against injuries caused by 
private actors.  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).  That includes a self-
inflicted injury.  Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 303-04 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  There is, however, an obligation to protect 
individuals against dangers that the government itself creates.  
Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 
2006).  We have identified four elements for a claim under 
the “state-created danger” doctrine: 
 
(1) [T]he harm ultimately caused was 
foreseeable and fairly direct; 
(2) a state actor acted with a degree of 
culpability that shocks the conscience; 
(3) a relationship between the state and the 
plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a 
member of a discrete class of persons subjected 
to the potential harm brought about by the 
state’s actions, as opposed to a member of the 
public in general; and 
(4)  a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to the 
citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted 
at all. 
Id. (citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The District Court here considered the second 
element in particular and determined that Officer Troxell’s 
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conduct lacked “a degree of culpability that shocks the 
conscience.”  Id.  We agree with that assessment.6  
 
For behavior by a government officer to shock the 
conscience, it must be more egregious than “negligently 
inflicted harm,” as mere negligence “is categorically beneath 
the threshold of constitutional due process.”  Cty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998).  Instead, 
“only the most egregious official conduct can be said to” 
meet that standard.  Id. at 846.  
 
The required degree of culpability varies based on the 
“the circumstances of each case,” and, in particular, on the 
time pressure under “which the government actor[] had to 
respond … .”  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 240 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Split-second decisions taking place in a 
“hyperpressurized environment,” usually do not shock the 
conscience unless they are done with “an intent to cause 
harm.”  Sanford, 456 F.3d at 309.  At the other end of the 
continuum, actions taken after time for “unhurried 
judgments” and careful deliberation may shock the 
conscience if done with deliberate indifference.  Id. (quoting 
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853).  In the middle are actions taken 
under “hurried deliberation.”  Id. at 310.  Such situations 
involve decisions that need to be made “in a matter of hours 
                                              
6 Because Troxell’s conduct does not shock the 
conscience, we do not address the other prongs of the “state-
created danger” doctrine.  Before the District Court and again 
on appeal, Troxell argued that the “state-created danger” 
claim against him should be barred by qualified immunity.  
The District Court did not address qualified immunity, and, 
given our disposition of the claim, neither do we. 
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or minutes.”  Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 
65 (3d Cir. 2002).  If that standard applies, then an officer’s 
actions may shock the conscience if they reveal a conscious 
disregard of “a great risk of serious harm rather than a 
substantial risk.”  Sanford, 456 F.3d at 310. 
 
 Not surprisingly, Troxell urges us to adopt the split-
second standard, while Haberle presses for the unhurried 
judgment standard.  The District Court applied the 
intermediate standard – the one for situations involving 
“hurried deliberation,” id. at 309, and that was correct.  Nixon 
had expressed suicidal tendencies and had stolen a deadly 
weapon.  There was not time for casual deliberation.  On the 
other hand, a few hours had passed since Nixon stole the gun 
and there was no indication that the situation was escalating 
or otherwise required instantaneous action by Troxell.  
Therefore, the District Court properly applied the 
intermediate standard and asked whether Troxell’s actions 
showed conscious disregard of a great risk of harm to Nixon. 
 
The decision Troxell made to ignore the advice of 
other officers and knock on the apartment door falls beneath 
the threshold of conscious disregard.  Haberle describes 
Troxell’s actions as “Ramboesque vigilantism,” (Opening Br. 
at 24), but the fact that Troxell chose to immediately knock 
while other officers counseled waiting manifests only a 
disagreement over how to manage a risk, not a disregard of it.  
As the District Court noted, “[u]nder the circumstances that 
the officers were confronting, any decision they could have 
made … was not free from risk to Nixon, the other occupants 
of the apartment, or the officers.”  (App. at 16-17.)  Nixon’s 
suicide is surely tragic, and, in its aftermath “it is natural to 
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second-guess the decisions of Troxell,” (App. at 17), but we 
cannot say that what he did shocks the conscience. 
 
C. Haberle Has Not Pled a Compensable Claim  
  Under the ADA 
 
The final issue on appeal involves Haberle’s claim that 
the Borough violated the ADA.  She argues that she is 
entitled to money damages because the Borough “fail[ed] to 
make reasonable modifications to [its] policies, practices and 
procedures to ensure that [Nixon’s] needs as an individual 
with a disability would be met.”  (App. at 87.)  While we 
agree that, in general, the ADA applies to arrest situations, 
Haberle fails to state a claim for damages under that statute 
because she does not allege facts showing that any inaction of 
the Borough reflects deliberate indifference. 
 
1. The ADA Generally Applies When Police 
  Officers Make an Arrest 
 
As a threshold matter, we consider whether the ADA 
applies when police officers make an arrest.  Although the 
question is debatable, we think the answer is generally yes.7  
                                              
7 According to Haberle, even if her ADA claim against 
the Borough was meritless at the point of arrest, it should still 
survive because the Borough’s failure to establish a suitable 
training program is, by itself, a violation of the ADA.  To 
support her theory, Haberle points to an opinion from the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 
2d 232 (M.D. Pa. 2003).  In Schorr, the court concluded that 
whether there was an ADA claim on the day of the arrest was 
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Our analysis begins with the statutory text.  See Ross v. Blake, 
136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016) (“Statutory interpretation, as we 
always say, begins with the text … .”).  To successfully state 
a claim under Title II of the ADA, a person “must 
demonstrate: (1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a 
disability; (3) [who] was excluded from participation in or 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity; (4) by reason of his disability.”  Bowers v. Nat’l 
                                                                                                     
“irrelevant” because the purported injury did not occur the 
day of the police altercation but instead “occurred well before 
that day, when the … policy makers failed to institute 
[policies] to accommodate disabled individuals … by giving 
the officers the tools and resources to handle the situation 
peacefully.”  Id. at 238. 
Schorr is a thoughtful effort to address difficult issues 
but, ultimately, its reasoning misses the mark because it is 
incompatible with the text of the ADA.  As the District Court 
here correctly observed, an ADA violation occurs if and when 
a disabled individual is “excluded from participation in” or 
“denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of 
a public entity” or is “subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity.”  (App. at 28 n.20 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132).)  A 
municipality’s failure to train its police is not actionable 
unless and until that failure leads directly to a denial of a 
needed accommodation or improper discrimination.  It is the 
denial that gives rise to the claim.  Thus, contrary to the 
assertion in Schorr that ADA deprivations could occur before 
the day of the problematic incident between the citizen and 
the police, it is the incident itself that must be the focus of 
attention. 
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Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n.32 (3d Cir. 
2007).8  The first question, then, is whether arrestees can be 
“qualified individuals” under the ADA, and the best response 
is that they can, for there is nothing to categorically exclude 
them from the statute’s broad coverage.9  See Gorman v. 
                                              
8 The language of the statute itself is, “no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, 
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12132. 
 
9 That arrestees can qualify does not, of course, mean 
that they necessarily will qualify.  There remains a question 
whether a potentially violent person with mental health 
problems who, while possessing a gun, barricades himself in 
another person’s apartment is a “qualified individual” under 
the ADA.  The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a 
disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or 
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and 
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the 
receipt of services or the participation in programs or 
activities provided by a public entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).  
We have previously noted that a “significant risk test” has 
been used to determine whether an individual is qualified to 
receive protection under the analogous Rehabilitation Act.  
See New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 
F.3d 293, 303 (3d Cir. 2007).  Whether application of that 
same test in the ADA context is appropriate, however, is not 
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Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that 
an arrestee could be a qualified individual under the ADA 
despite not having “‘volunteered’ to be arrested”); cf. Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1998) (noting 
that a state prisoner could be a “qualified individual” under 
the ADA even when participation in a service, program, or 
activity of the State is not voluntary). 
 
The second question is whether arrestees may have 
disabilities covered by the ADA, and the answer to that is 
clearly “yes.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining 
“disability” for purposes of the ADA).  Like the overall 
population, the subset of people who violate the law, or are 
suspected of such, will naturally include those with 
recognized disabilities.  The dragnet, so to speak, gathers of 
every kind. 
 
Saving the third qualifying question for last, we next 
note that the fourth requirement, that the claimant has been 
excluded from a service, program, or activity or discriminated 
against by reason of his disability, is also one that can be 
satisfied in the context of an arrest.  If the arrestee’s 
“disability ‘played a role in the … decisionmaking process 
and … had a determinative effect on the outcome of that 
process[,]’” i.e., if the arrestee’s disability was a “but for” 
cause of the deprivation or harm he suffered, then the fourth 
element of an ADA claim has been met.  See CG v. Pa. Dep’t 
of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 n.11 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting New 
Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 
300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
                                                                                                     
something that we need to address now.  We reserve 
judgment on that issue for another day. 
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The most controversial question pertinent to whether 
the ADA applies when police officers are making arrests 
comes in the context of the statute’s third requirement.  We 
must consider whether arrests made by police officers are 
“services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” or 
alternatively, whether police officers may be liable under the 
ADA for “subject[ing a qualified individual] to 
discrimination” while effectuating an arrest.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12132. 
 
The text of the ADA is deliberately broad and police 
departments “fall[] ‘squarely within the statutory definition of 
a “public entity.”’”  Gorman, 152 F.3d at 912 (quoting 
Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210); see 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B) 
(defining “public entity” to include, among other things, “any 
State or local government” and “any department, agency, 
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or 
States or local government”); see also Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 
209-10 (concluding that state prisons are public entities under 
the ADA because “the ADA plainly covers state institutions 
…”).  Furthermore, persuasive precedent indicates that the 
ADA’s reference to “the services, programs, and activities of 
a public entity” should likewise be interpreted broadly “to 
‘encompass[] virtually everything that a public entity does.’”  
Babcock v. Michigan, 812 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 
F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also Yeskey v. Comm. of 
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting 
that similar “broad language” in the ADA’s implementing 
regulations was “intended to appl[y] to anything a public 
entity does” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), aff’d, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).  Nevertheless, courts 
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across the country are divided on whether police fieldwork 
and arrests can rightly be called “services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity … .”  42 U.S.C. § 12132.10 
 
Fortunately, we do not need to resolve that issue in this 
case, because § 12132 is framed in the alternative and we can 
look instead to the second phrase, namely, to whether the 
arrestee was “subjected to discrimination” by the police.  Id.; 
see also Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1084 
(11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the court did not need to 
decide “whether police conduct during an arrest is a program, 
service, or activity covered by the ADA” because a plaintiff 
“could still attempt to show an ADA claim under the final 
clause in the Title II statute”).  The “subjected to 
discrimination” phrase in Title II is “a catch-all phrase that 
prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of 
the context.”  Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Bledsoe v. 
Palm Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 
816, 821-22 (11th Cir. 1998)); accord Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs Frederick Cty., 673 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 
37, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by 
Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2001).  
                                              
10 The Supreme Court had granted certiorari to address 
that question, City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, __ 
U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014), but it later dismissed the writ 
as improvidently granted.  City & Cty. of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1773-74 (2015).  The 
issue thus continues to divide some federal courts.  See 
generally Robyn Levin, Note, Responsiveness to Difference: 
ADA Accommodations in the Course of an Arrest, 69 Stan. L. 
Rev. 269 (2017) (compiling cases). 
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Moreover, we have said that “[d]iscrimination under the ADA 
encompasses not only adverse actions motivated by prejudice 
and fear of disabilities, but also includes failing to make 
reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff’s disabilities.”  
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 
1999).  It follows, then, that police officers may violate the 
ADA when making an arrest by failing to provide reasonable 
accommodations for a qualified arrestee’s disability, thus 
subjecting him to discrimination.  Given that catchall, we 
believe that the ADA can indeed apply to police conduct 
during an arrest. 
 
That conclusion, which is suggested by the wide scope 
of the ADA’s text, has support from our sister circuits.  See, 
e.g., Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1217 (“Title II of the [ADA] 
applies to arrests.”); Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 
973 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ADA … appl[ies] to law 
enforcement officers taking disabled suspects into custody.”).  
Even though there is some disagreement concerning the point 
during a law enforcement encounter at which the ADA 
applies to police conduct, no court of appeals has held that the 
ADA does not apply at all.  See, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 
F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding “that Title II does not 
apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported 
disturbances or other incidents … prior to the officer’s 
securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to 
human life”); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (“[A] broad rule categorically excluding arrests 
from the scope of Title II … is not the law.”).11 
                                              
11 A successful ADA claim demands more than an 
allegation of an arrest of a qualified individual with a 
disability.  The implementing regulations for the ADA make 
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2. Haberle Does Not Allege Deliberate  
  Indifference 
 
Even though the ADA generally applies in the arrest 
context, Haberle’s claim for money damages against the 
Borough fails as a matter of law because she has not 
adequately pled that the Borough acted with deliberate 
indifference to the risk of an ADA violation.  She seeks 
compensatory damages from the Borough under the ADA, 
but that remedy is not available absent proof of “intentional 
discrimination.”  S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[C]laims for 
                                                                                                     
clear that there must also have been a failure to make 
reasonable accommodations.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) 
(stating that public entities are only required to make 
“reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures” to comply with the ADA (emphasis added)); see 
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131 (referencing “reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies, or practices” in defining 
“qualified individual”); supra note 9.  The analysis as to what 
is “reasonable” under the circumstances, including exigent 
circumstances, and as to how their determination is reached, 
presents complicated issues.  See Levin, supra note 10.  We 
have no occasion now to consider the analytical approach to 
an ADA claim arising from an arrest because we conclude 
that Haberle’s ADA claim for money damages fails due to her 
failure to plead deliberate indifference.  Nevertheless, in the 
future, we may need to consider whether and under what 
circumstances it is reasonable to require police officers to 
make accommodations during an arrest when they face an 
exigent threat. 
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compensatory damages under … § 202 of the ADA also 
require a finding of intentional discrimination.”).  To prove 
intentional discrimination, an ADA claimant must prove at 
least deliberate indifference, id. at 263, and to plead 
deliberate indifference, a claimant must allege 
“(1) knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially 
likely to be violated … and (2) failure to act despite that 
knowledge.”  Id. at 265 (emphasis omitted). 
 
Haberle, however, fails to allege that the Borough was 
aware that its existing policies made it substantially likely that 
disabled individuals would be denied their federally protected 
rights under the ADA.  She could have met that obligation in 
two different ways: first, by alleging facts suggesting that the 
existing policies caused a failure to “adequately respond to a 
pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiffs,’” or, 
second, by alleging facts indicating that she could prove “that 
the risk of … cognizable harm was ‘so great and so obvious 
that the risk and the failure … to respond will alone’ support 
finding” deliberate indifference.  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 
256 F.3d 120, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Sample v. 
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989) (in the context of 
§1983 suits by prison inmates)); see S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729 
F.3d at 263 n.23 (noting that the standard for proving 
deliberate indifference being adopted for the ADA context “is 
consistent with our standard of deliberate indifference in the 
context of § 1983 suits by prison inmates”). 
 
Haberle’s complaint does neither.  She relies on 
general allegations that the Borough has “a history of 
violating the civil rights of residents[,]” (App. at 76), offering 
only hazy support for that statement.  Even if she could 
ultimately prove a generalized history of civil rights 
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violations, that would not necessarily demonstrate “a pattern 
of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiff[’s.]”  Beers-
Capitol, 256 F.3d at 136 (emphasis added).  Because those 
other vaguely referenced violations have not been adequately 
alleged to be “similar to the violation at issue here, they could 
not have put [the Defendant] on notice” that policies, 
practices, and procedures had to be changed.  Connick v. 
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 (2011).  Nevertheless, with 
respect to that defect, Haberle should be given an opportunity 
to amend her complaint, if possible, to salvage her ADA 
claim against the Borough, since this failure in her complaint 
is not one as to which we can say definitively that amendment 
would be futile.12 
                                              
12 Haberle contends that the District Court erred in not 
granting her leave to amend her complaint again.  She did not, 
however, “request[] leave to amend, nor suggest[] the 
existence of any allegations not contained in the Amended 
Complaint.”  (App. at 3.)  On appeal, she has not pointed to 
any amendments that she would have made to her complaint 
if given the opportunity to do so.  (Opening Br. at 24-25.)  
And it seems clear that she cannot make any amendment that 
would save her § 1983 claim, so granting leave to amend 
would be futile with respect to that claim.  See Alston v. 
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We have held that 
even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, if a 
complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court 
must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment 
would be inequitable or futile.”).  But Haberle should be 
given the narrow opportunity to amend her complaint with 
respect to her ADA claim, particularly her allegations of a 
history of civil rights violations by the Borough, because 
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Haberle also complains that “a set of policies and 
procedures had been drafted by the Department” which 
should have guided “interact[ion] with mentally disturbed 
individuals, and those in crisis situations[,]” but that “the said 
policies and procedures were not adopted by the Borough 
Council, nor were they implemented by the Mayor or Police 
Department.”  (App. at 78-79.)  Yet Haberle does not allege 
any facts indicating that the policies were drafted because of 
an awareness that the pre-existing policies were substantially 
likely to lead to a violation of citizens’ rights.  Absent such 
awareness, a municipality cannot be found to be deliberately 
indifferent merely for considering but not yet adopting new 
policies or amendments to old ones.  To impose liability on 
that basis would create a perverse deterrent to voluntary 
reform. 
 
Haberle likewise fails to allege that the risk of harm 
was “so great and so obvious,” as to obviate the need for her 
to allege facts pertaining to the Borough’s knowledge.  Beers-
Capitol, 256 F.3d at 136 (quoting Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118).  
At most, she claims that the Borough’s conduct falls “beneath 
the nationally recognized standards for police department 
operations” with regard to those with mental illness.  (App. at 
75.)  But, assuming that is true, falling below national 
standards does not, in and of itself, make the risk of an ADA 
violation in such circumstances “so patently obvious that a 
[municipality] could be held liable” without “a pre-existing 
pattern of violations.”  Connick, 563 U.S. at 64.  As the 
District Court explained, “[t]he failure to train police officers 
                                                                                                     
deliberate indifference was not discussed in the District Court 
as to that claim. 
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to refrain from doing so much as knocking on the door when 
they receive a call that a mentally ill individual has stolen a 
firearm, is contemplating suicide, and may be in the presence 
of others whose status is unknown is not so obvious [a 
deficiency] that the Borough could be said to have been 
deliberately indifferent to the need for that training.”  (App. at 
22.) 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate in part the District Court’s dismissal of Haberle’s 
claims, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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Greenaway, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring 
 I join the majority opinion and agree that Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to arrests when 
the arrestee is “subjected to discrimination” by the police.  Maj. 
Op. at 18 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132).  However, I would also 
hold that—based on the text of Title II, the Department of 
Justice’s interpretations of Title II, and the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998)—
that arrests constitute “services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity” under the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 12132.1  
I. 
 As the majority has stated, to successfully state a claim 
under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must, inter alia, 
demonstrate that “[he or she] was excluded from participation 
in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities 
of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.”  Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting Bowers v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n.32 (3d Cir. 
                                              
 1 In contrast to Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 
1072, 1084 (11th Cir. 2007)—where the Eleventh Circuit 
declined to decide “whether police conduct during an arrest is 
a program, service, or activity covered by the ADA” because a 
plaintiff “could still attempt to show an ADA claim under the 
final clause in the Title II statute”—the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Frederick Cty., 
counsels that the Court should reach both clauses in light of 
Yeskey.  673 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n light 
of Yeskey’s expansive interpretation, the ADA applies to police 
interrogations under either test.” (emphasis added)).   
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2007)) (emphasis added).  However, the majority’s holding 
only allows an arrestee to succeed on an ADA claim if he or 
she can prove discrimination by a public entity, leaving open 
the question of whether an arrestee can recover under the ADA 
for being “denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12132.  This is 
significant because “[c]ases charging discrimination are 
uniquely difficult to prove and often depend upon 
circumstantial evidence.”  Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
& Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1071 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 In my estimation, the statutory text of the ADA makes 
clear that arrests can qualify as a “service[], program[], or 
activit[y]” of the police, and I therefore see no reason to hang 
a cloud of doubt over an arrestee’s right to recovery under this 
alternate theory.  Congress declared that the purpose of the 
ADA was “to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).  
“[S]ervices, programs, or activities,” is a phrase that Congress 
intended to be construed consistently with its definition in the 
precursor to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  42 
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (declaring that Title II is not to “be 
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied 
under . . . the Rehabilitation Act of 1973”); see also Bragdon 
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998) (holding that § 12201(a) 
“requires [courts] to construe the ADA to grant at least as much 
protection as provided by . . . the Rehabilitation Act”).  Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act defines “program or activity” to 
mean “all of the operations” of an entity, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) 
(emphasis added), and we have recognized that “[t]he statutory 
definition of ‘[p]rogram or activity’ in Section 504 indicates 
that the terms were intended to be all-encompassing.”  Yeskey 
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v. Com. of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(alterations in original) (emphasis added), aff'd sub nom. 
Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 213.  Similarly, our sister circuits have also 
relied on § 504 to construe “services, programs, or activities” 
broadly for purposes of Title II.   
 In Barden v. City of Sacramento, for example, the Ninth 
Circuit explained:  
Th[e] broad construction of the phrase, 
“services, programs, or activities,” is supported 
by the plain language of the Rehabilitation Act . 
. . The legislative history of the ADA similarly 
supports construing the language generously, 
providing that Title II “essentially . . . simply 
extends the anti-discrimination prohibition 
embodied in section 504 [of the Rehabilitation 
Act] to all actions of state and local 
governments.” H.R.Rep. No. 101–485(II), at 84 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
367 (emphasis added); see also id. at 
151, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 434 
(“Title II . . . makes all activities of State and 
local governments subject to the types of 
prohibitions against discrimination . . . included 
in section 504 . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
292 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2002) (first alteration added); 
see also Fortyune v. City of Lomita, 766 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (“[T]he term ‘services, programs, or activities’ as 
used in the ADA is . . . broad, bringing within its scope 
anything a public entity does.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Babcock v. Michigan, 812 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 
2016) (“[T]he phrase ‘services, programs, and activities,’ . . . 
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‘encompass[es] virtually everything that a public entity does.’” 
(quoting Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 
1998))); Johnson, 151 F.3d at 570 (“[A] broad reading of 
‘programs, services, and activities’ is consistent with the broad 
definition used in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  This is 
significant, because we look to the Rehabilitation Act for 
guidance in construing similar provisions in the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.” (emphasis added)).  Accordingly, under 
the clear language of Title II, the terms “services, programs, or 
activities” regulate arrests independent of the catch-all phrase 
that prohibits all discrimination by public entities.2   
II. 
 In addition to the plain text, the Department of Justice’s 
interpretations of Title II also provide that arrests are “services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity” under the ADA.  42 
U.S.C. § 12132.  Pursuant to its authority to “promulgate 
regulations” and “render technical assistance” to assist public 
                                              
 2 The Supreme Court has cautioned that the open-
endedness of “services, programs, or activities” should not be 
confused for ambiguity.  See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212 (“As we 
have said before, the fact that a statute can be applied in 
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not 
demonstrate ambiguity.  It demonstrates breadth.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010) (“In employing 
intentionally broad language, Congress avoids the necessity of 
spelling out in advance every contingency to which a statute 
could apply.”).   
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entities in complying with the ADA, the Department of Justice 
has interpreted Title II to apply to law enforcement activities, 
generally, and arrests, specifically.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12134(a) 
(authority to promulgate regulation), 12206(c)(1) (authority to 
render technical assistance).  In 2006, the Department issued 
guidance stating that “[l]aw enforcement agencies are covered 
by [Title II of the ADA] because they are programs of State or 
local governments,” and that Title II “affects virtually 
everything that officers and deputies do,” including “arresting, 
booking, and holding suspects.”  U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Commonly Asked Questions About the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Law Enforcement § I (Apr. 4, 2006) 
(emphasis added).3  The 2006 guidance is consistent with the 
Department’s expansive interpretation of Title II.  See 28 
C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B (“[T]itle II applies to anything a public 
entity does.”).   
  
                                              
 3 This guidance merits at least Skidmore deference 
because it reflects “a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.”  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); 
see also Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 225 (5th Cir. 
2011) (“[B]ecause Congress directed the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) to elucidate Title II with implementing 
regulations, DOJ’s views at least would warrant respect and 
might be entitled to even more deference.” (internal quotation 
marks and footnotes omitted)). 
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III. 
 Lastly, the majority is reluctant to determine whether an 
arrest qualifies as a service, program, or activity under Title II 
because—according to it—this is an issue that “courts across 
the country are divided on . . . .”  Maj. Op. at 17-18.  Two of 
our sister circuits have addressed this precise issue to date.  In 
Sheehan v. City and Cty. of S.F., the Ninth Circuit held that 
arrests are covered by Title II because “[t]he ADA applies 
broadly to police ‘services, programs, or activities.’” 743 F.3d 
1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132), rev’d 
in part on other grounds and cert. dismissed in part as 
improvidently granted, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).  Conversely, 
the Fourth Circuit in Rosen v. Montgomery Cty. Md. concluded 
that arrests are not services, programs, or activities because 
“[t]he terms ‘eligible’ and ‘participate’ imply voluntariness on 
the part of an applicant who seeks a benefit from the State.” 
121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Torcasio v. Murray, 
57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995)).   
 The Supreme Court, however, squarely rejected 
Rosen’s reasoning in Yeskey.  See 524 U.S. at 211 (rejecting 
argument “that the words ‘eligibility’ and ‘participation’ imply 
voluntariness on the part of an applicant who seeks a benefit 
from the State”).  Accordingly, “[c]ourts across the country 
have called Rosen’s holding into question in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in [Yeskey].”  Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs Frederick Cty., 673 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(collecting cases); see, e.g., Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 
897 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Rosen’s] reasoning has now been 
discredited by the Supreme Court.”).  Indeed, in Seremeth, the 
Fourth Circuit declined to rely on Rosen and held that Title II 
applies to police interrogations based on the phrase “services, 
programs, or activities” in addition to the catch-all 
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antidiscrimination phrase.  673 F.3d at 338-39; id. at 338 n.2 
(“[W]e do not rely on the portion of the district court’s decision 
that depends on the ‘program or activity’ discussion in 
Rosen”).   
 We therefore need not be troubled by declining to 
follow Rosen and its logic.  Rather, we should be cognizant that 
no court of appeals has held that arrests are not “services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132, 
since the Supreme Court decided Yeskey twenty years ago.   
IV. 
 The statutory text, the Department of Justice’s 
interpretations of the text, and the Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of the ADA in Yeskey establish that arrests are 
“services, programs, or activities of a public entity” under Title 
II.  42 U.S.C. § 12132.  I therefore see no reason to be less than 
plain that an arrestee with a disability has two paths to 
vindicate his or her disability rights.   
